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Abstract
The widespread use of smart devices gives rise to both
security and privacy concerns. Fingerprinting smart de-
vices can assist in authenticating physical devices, but
it can also jeopardize privacy by allowing remote iden-
tification without user awareness. We propose a novel
fingerprinting approach that uses the microphones and
speakers of smart phones to uniquely identify an indi-
vidual device. During fabrication, subtle imperfections
arise in device microphones and speakers which induce
anomalies in produced and received sounds. We ex-
ploit this observation to fingerprint smart devices through
playback and recording of audio samples. We use audio-
metric tools to analyze and explore different acoustic fea-
tures and analyze their ability to successfully fingerprint
smart devices. Our experiments show that it is even pos-
sible to fingerprint devices that have the same vendor and
model; we were able to accurately distinguish over 93%
of all recorded audio clips from 15 different units of the
same model. Our study identifies the prominent acoustic
features capable of fingerprinting devices with high suc-
cess rate and examines the effect of background noise
and other variables on fingerprinting accuracy.
1 Introduction
Mobile devices, including smartphones, PDAs, and
tablets, are quickly becoming widespread in modern so-
ciety. In 2012 a total of 1.94 billion mobile devices were
shipped, of which 75% were smart and highly-featured
phones [6, 9, 15]. Canalys predicted that the mobile de-
vice market will reach 2.6 billion units by 2016, with
smartphones and tablets continuing to dominate ship-
ments [15] . The rapid uptake of intelligent mobile de-
vices is not surprising, due to the numerous advantages
they provide consumers, from entertainment and social
applications to business and advanced computing capa-
bilities. However, smartphones, with all their interactive,
location-centric, and connectivity-based features impose
threatening concerns on user privacy and information se-
curity. There has been a large body of research work
highlighting and proposing solutions for privacy and se-
curity issues of smartphones [10, 36, 37, 42, 60, 73, 82].
All these works center around securing the software, in-
cluding the operating system and network stack, of mo-
bile devices, for example by instilling fine-grained ac-
cess control policies, or restricting dataflow, containing
private data, to a network sink.
In this paper we propose a novel technique for finger-
printing the hardware of smartphones. The observation
is that even if the software on mobile devices is strength-
ened, hardware-level idiosyncrasies in microphones and
speaker can be used to fingerprint physical devices. Dur-
ing manufacturing, imperfections are introduced in the
analog circuitry of these components, and as such, two
microphones and speakers are never alike. Through an
observational study, we find that these imperfections are
substantial enough, and prevalent enough, that we can re-
liably distinguish between devices by passively observ-
ing audio, and conducting a simple spectral analysis on
the recorded audio. Our approach can substantially sim-
plify the ability for an adversary to track and identify
people in public locations, identify callers, and produce
other threats to the security and privacy of mobile device
users. Our approach works well even with few samples
— for example, we show that with our techniques, an ad-
versary could even use the short ringtones produces by
mobile device speakers to reliably track users in public
environments.
Our approach centers around development of a novel
fingerprinting mechanism, which aims to “pull out” im-
perfections in device circuitry. Our mechanism has two
parts: a method to extract auditory fingerprints and a
method to efficiently search for matching fingerprints
from a database. To generate fingerprints of speakers
we record audio clips played from smartphones on an
external device (i.e., laptop/PC) and vice versa for gen-
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erating fingerprints of microphones. We use two dif-
ferent classifiers to evaluate our fingerprinting approach.
Moreover, we test our fingerprinting approach for dif-
ferent genre of audio clips at various frequencies. We
also elaborately study various audio features that can be
used to accurately fingerprint smartphones. Our study
reveals that mel-frequency cepstral coefficient (MFCC)
is the dominant feature for fingerprinting smartphones.
We also analyze the sensitivity of our fingerprinting ap-
proach against different factors like sampling frequency,
distance between speaker and recorder, training set size
and ambient background noise.
Contributions. We offer the following contributions:
• We propose a novel approach to fingerprinting
smart devices. Our approach leverages the manu-
facturing idiosyncrasies of microphones and speak-
ers embedded in smart devices.
• We study feasibility of a spectrum of existing audio
features that can be used to accurately fingerprint
smartphones. We find that the mel-frequency cep-
stral coefficient (MFCC) performs particularly well
for fingerprinting smartphones.
• We investigate two different classifiers to evalu-
ate our fingerprinting approach. We conclude that
Gaussian Mixture Models (GMM) are more effec-
tive in classifying our recorded audio fingerprints.
• We perform experiments across several different
genres of audio excerpts. We also analyze how dif-
ferent factors like sampling frequency, distance be-
tween speaker and recorder, training set size and
ambient background noise impact the accuracy of
our fingerprinting.
• Finally, we discuss how our fingerprinting approach
can be used as an additional factor for authentica-
tion.
Roadmap. The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows. Section 2 gives an overview of our fingerprint-
ing approach. We discuss why microphones and speakers
integrated in smartphones can be used to generate unique
fingerprints in Section 3. Section 4 describes the differ-
ent audio features considered in our experiments, along
with the classification algorithms used in our evaluation.
Section 5 elaborately presents our experimental results.
We discuss two diametric applications of our device fin-
gerprinting in Section 6. We describe some related works
in Section 7. Section 8 discusses some limitations of our
approach. Finally we conclude in Section 9.
2 Overview
In this section we give an overview of our approach, and
identify the key challenges that we address in this paper.
The key insight behind our work is that imperfections
in smart device hardware induce unique signatures on re-
ceived/transmitted audio, and these unique signatures, if
identified, can be used to fingerprint the device. Our ap-
proach consists of three key components. The first chal-
lenge we encounter is acquiring a set of audio samples
for analysis in the first place. To do this, we have a
listener module, responsible for receiving and recording
device audio. The listener module could be deployed as
an application on the smart device (many mobile OSes
allow direct access to microphone inputs), or as a stand
alone (e.g., the adversary has a microphone in a public
setting to pick up device ringtones). The next challenge
is to effectively identify device signatures from the re-
ceived audio stream. To do this, we have an analyzer
module, which leverages signal processing techniques to
localize spectral anomalies, and construct a ‘fingerprint’
of the auditory characteristics of the device.
A key question that remains, which forms a major fo-
cus of this paper, is in construction of an effective finger-
printing scheme. Our goal is to determine a scheme that
maximizes the ability to distinguish different devices. To
do this, it helps to have some understanding of how de-
vices differ at a physical level. Devices can vary at differ-
ent layers of the manufacturing process. The most obvi-
ous way to distinguish devices manufactured by different
vendors is to analyze the protocol stack installed in the
devices. Usually different vendors have their own dis-
tinct features integrated inside the protocol stack. A close
analysis of the protocol stack can help in distinguishing
devices from different vendors. However, this approach
is not helpful in distinguishing devices produced by the
same vendor. To distinguish devices produced by the
same vendor we need to look more deeply into the de-
vices themselves because at the hardware level no two
device are same. Hardware imperfections are likely to
arise during the manufacturing process of sensors, radio
transmitters and crystal oscillators suggesting the exis-
tence of unique fingerprints. This idiosyncrasies can be
exploited to distinguish devices. Figure 1 illustrates the
different device specific features that could be utilized to
identify devices uniquely. We investigate properties of
device hardware in more detail in Section 3.
A second aspect to this question is what sort of au-
dio analysis techniques are most effective in identify-
ing unique signatures of device hardware. There are a
large number of audio properties which could be used
(spectral entropy, zero crossings, pitch, etc.) as well
as a broad spectrum of analysis algorithms that can be
used to summarize these properties (principle component
analysis, linear discriminant analysis, feature selection,
etc.). We will study alternative properties to character-
ize hardware-induced auditory anomalies in Section 4.1
as well as algorithms for effectively clustering them in
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Section 4.2.
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Figure 1: Device specific features that can be exploited to
uniquely distinguish devices.
3 Source of Fingerprints
In this section we will take a closer look at the micro-
phones and speakers embedded on today’s smartphones.
This will help understand how microphones and speakers
can act as a potential source of unique fingerprints.
3.1 Closer Look at Microphones
Microphones in modern smartphones are based on Micro
Electro Mechanical Systems (MEMS) [11,13,18]. To en-
hance active noise and echo canceling capabilities, most
smartphones today have more than one MEMS micro-
phone. For example, the iPhone 5 has a total of three em-
bedded MEMS microphones [11]. According to the IHS-
iSuppli report, Apple and Samsung were the top con-
sumers of MEMS microphones in 2012, accounting for a
combined 54% of all shipped MEMS microphones [18].
A MEMS microphone, sometimes called a micro-
phone chip or silicon microphone, consists of a coil-less
pressure-sensitive diaphragm directly etched into a sili-
con chip. It is comprised of a MEMS die and a comple-
mentary metal-oxide-semiconductor (CMOS) die com-
bined in an acoustic housing [8,12]. The CMOS often in-
cludes both a preamplifier as well as an analog-to-digital
(AD) converter. Modern fabrication techniques enable
highly compact deigns, making them well suited for in-
tegration in digital mobile devices. The internal archi-
tecture of a MEMS microphone is shown on Figure 2.
From the figure we can see that the MEMS microphone’s
physical design is based on a variable capacitor consist-
ing of a highly flexible diaphragm in close proximity to
a perforated, rigid back-plate. The perforations permit
the air between the diaphragm and back-plate to escape.
When an acoustic signal reaches the diaphragm through
the acoustic holes, the diaphragm is set in motion. This
mechanical deformation causes capacitive change which
in turn causes voltage change. In this way sound pres-
sure is converted into an electrical signal for further pro-
cessing. The back-chamber acts as a acoustic resonator
and the ventilation hole allows the air compressed inside
the back chamber to flow out, allowing the diaphragm to
move back into its original place.
The sensitivity of the microphone depends on how
well the diaphragm deflects to acoustic pressure; it also
depends on the gap between the static back-plate and
the flexible diaphragm. Unfortunately, even though the
manufacturing process of these microphones has been
streamlined, no two chips roll off the assembly line func-
tioning in exactly the same way1. While subtle imper-
fections in the microphone chips may go unnoticed by
human ears, computationally such discrepancies may be
sufficient to discriminate them, as we later show.
3.2 Closer Look at Microspeakers
Micro-speakers are a scaled down version of a basic
acoustic speaker. So lets first look at how speakers work
before we discuss how microspeakers can be used to gen-
erate unique fingerprints. Figure 3(a) shows the basic
components of a speaker. The diaphragm is usually made
of paper, plastic or metal and its edges are connected to
the suspension. The suspension is a rim of flexible ma-
terial that allows the diaphragm to move. The narrow
end of the diaphragms cone is connected to the voice
coil. The voice coil is attached to the basket by a spider
(damper), which holds the coil in position, but allows it
to move freely back and forth. A permanent magnet is
positioned directly below the voice coil.
Sound waves are produced whenever electrical cur-
rent flows through the voice coil, which acts as an elec-
tromagnet. Running varying electrical current through
the voice coil induces a varying magnetic field around
the coil, altering the magnetization of the metal it is
wrapped around. When the electromagnet’s polar ori-
entation switches, so does the direction of repulsion and
attraction. In this way, the magnetic force between the
voice coil and the permanent magnet causes the voice
coil to vibrate, which in turn vibrates the speaker di-
aphragm to generate sound waves.
Figure 3(b) shows a typical MEMS microspeaker chip
and Figure 3(c) shows the components inside the micros-
peaker [26, 81]. The components are similar to that of a
basic speaker; the only difference is the size and fabrica-
tion process [28,49,74]. The amplitude and frequency of
the sound wave produced by the speaker’s diaphragm is
dictated respectively by the distance and rate at which the
voice coil moves. However, due to the inevitable varia-
tions and imperfections of the manufacturing process, no
1Imperfections can arise for the following reasons: slight variations
in the chemical composition of components from one batch to the next,
wear in the manufacturing machines or changes in temperature and hu-
midity.
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⇒Figure 2: The internal architecture of MEMS microphone chip used in smartphones.
(a) (b) (c)
Figure 3: (a) The basic components of a speaker, (b) A typical MEMS microspeaker used in smartphones, (c) The internal archi-
tecture of a microspeaker chip.
two speaker are going to be alike. Thus, subtle differ-
ences in sound generated by different speakers can arise.
In our work, we develop techniques to computationally
localize and evaluate these differences.
4 Audio Features and Classification Algo-
rithms
In this section we briefly describe the acoustic features
that we used in generating fingerprints. We also discuss
the classification algorithms used in identifying the de-
vices from which the fingerprints originated.
4.1 Audio Features
Given our knowledge that imperfections exist in de-
vice audio hardware, we now need some way to detect
them. To do this, our approach identifies acoustic fea-
tures from an audio stream, and uses the features to con-
struct a fingerprint of the device. Computing acoustic
features from an audio stream is a subject of much re-
search [20, 25, 61, 76]. To gain an understanding of how
a broad range of acoustic features are affected by device
imperfections we investigate a total of 15 acoustics fea-
tures (listed in Table 1), all of which have been well-
documented by researchers. A detailed description of
each acoustic feature is available in Appendix A.
4.2 Classification Algorithms
Next, we need some way to leverage the set of fea-
tures to perform device identification. To achieve this,
we leverage a classification algorithm, which takes ob-
servations (features) from the observed device as input,
and attempts to classify the device into one of several
previously-observed sets.
To do this, our approach works as follows. First, we
perform a training step, by collecting a number of ob-
servations from a set of devices. Each observation (data
point) corresponds to a set of features observed from that
device, represented as a tuple with one dimension per
feature. As such, data points can be thought of as ex-
isting in a hyper-dimensional space, with each axis cor-
responding to the observed value of a corresponding fea-
ture. Our approach then applies a classification algorithm
to build a representation of these data points, which can
later be used to associate new observations with device
types. When a new observation is collected, the clas-
sification algorithm returns the most likely device that
caused the observation.
To do this effectively, we need an efficient classi-
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Table 1: Explored acoustic features
# Feature Dimension Description
1 RMS 1 Square root of the arithmetic mean of the squares of the signal strength at various frequencies
2 ZCR 1 The rate at which the signal changes sign from positive to negative or back
3 Low-Energy-Rate 1 The percentage of frames with RMS power less than the average RMS power for the whole audio signal
4 Spectral Centroid 1 Represents the center of mass of a spectral power distribution
5 Spectral Entropy 1 Captures the peaks of a spectrum and their locations
6 Spectral Irregularity 1 Measures the degree of variation of the successive peaks of a spectrum
7 Spectral Spread 1 Defines the dispersion of the spectrum around its centroid
8 Spectral Skewness 1 Represents the coefficient of skewness of a spectrum
9 Spectral Kurtosis 1 Measure of the flatness or spikiness of a distribution relative to a normal distribution
10 Spectral Rolloff 1 Defines the frequency below which 85% of the distribution magnitude is concentrated
11 Spectral Brightness 1 Computes the amount of spectral energy corresponding to frequencies higher than a given cut-off threshold
12 Spectral Flatness 1 Measures how energy is spread across the spectrum
13 MFCCs 13 Compactly represents spectrum amplitudes
14 Chromagram 12 Representation of the distribution of energy along the 12 distinct semitones or pitch classes
15 Tonal Centroid 6 Maps a chromagram onto a six-dimensional Hypertorus structure
fication algorithm. In our work, we compare perfor-
mance of two alternate approaches described below: k-
nearest neighbors (associates an incoming data point
with the device corresponding to the nearest “learned”
data points), and Gaussian mixture models (computes a
probability distribution for each device, and determines
the maximally-likely association).
k-NN: The k-nearest neighbors algorithm (k-NN) is a
non-parametric lazy learning algorithm. The term “non-
parametric” means that the k-NN algorithm does not
make any assumptions about the underlying data dis-
tribution, which is useful in analyzing real-world data
with complex underlying distribution. The term “lazy
learning” means that the k-NN algorithm does not use
the training data to make any generalization, rather all
the training data are used in the testing phase making it
computationally expensive (however, optimizations are
possible). The k-NN algorithm works by first computing
the distance from the input data point to all training data
points and then classifies the input data point by taking
a majority vote of the k closest training records in the
feature space [34]. The best choice of k depends upon
the data; generally, larger values of k reduce the effect
of noise on the classification, but make boundaries be-
tween classes less distinct. We will discuss more about
the choice of k in Section 5.
GMM: A Gaussian mixture model is a probabilistic
model that assumes all the data points are generated
from a mixture of a finite number of Gaussian distri-
butions with unknown parameters. The unknown pat-
terns and mixture weights are estimated from training
samples using an expectation–maximization (EM) algo-
rithm [30]. During the matching phase the fingerprint for
an unknown recording is first compared with a database
of pre-computed GMMs and then the class label of the
GMM that gives the highest likelihood is returned as
the expected class for the unknown fingerprint. GMMs
are often used in biometric systems, most notably in
human speaker recognition systems, due to their capa-
bility of representing a large class of sample distribu-
tions [70, 76].
5 Evaluation
In this section we perform a series of experiments to eval-
uate how well we can fingerprint smartphones by exploit-
ing the manufacturing idiosyncrasies of microphones and
speakers embedded in them. We start by describing
how we performed our experiments (Section 5.1). Next,
we briefly discuss the setup for fingerprinting devices
through speakers and microphones (Section 5.2 and 5.3).
We then look at fingerprinting devices made by different
vendors (Section 5.4) and later on focus on identifying
devices manufactured by the same vendor (Section 5.5).
We also perform an analysis of which features help most
when identifying devices from the same vendor, by de-
termining the dominant (most-relevant) set of audio fea-
tures (Section 5.5.1). The performance of our approach
is affected by certain aspects of the operating environ-
ment, and we study sensitivity to such factors in Sec-
tion 5.6.
5.1 Methodology
To perform our experiments, we constructed a small
testbed environment with real smartphone device hard-
ware. In particular, our default environment consisted
of a 266 square foot (14’x19’) office room, with nine-
foot dropped ceilings with polystyrene tile, comprising
a graduate student office in a University-owned building
(used to house the computer science department). The
room was filled with desks and chairs, and opens out on
a public hall with foot traffic. The room also receives a
minimal amount of ambient noise from air conditioning,
desktop computers, and florescent lighting. We placed
smartphones in various locations in the room. To emu-
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Table 2: Types of phones used
Maker Model Quantity
Apple iPhone 5 1
Google Nexus 4G 1
Samsung Galaxy Note 2 1
Motorola Droid A855 15
Sony Ericsson W518 1
Table 3: Types of audio excerpts
Type Description
Instrumental Musical instruments playing together, e.g., ringtone
Human speech Small segments of human speech
Song Combination of human voice & instrumental sound
late an attacker, we placed an ACER Aspire 5745 lap-
top in the room. To investigate performance with inex-
pensive hardware, we used the laptop’s built-in micro-
phone to collect audio samples (an attacker willing to
purchase a higher-quality microphone may attain better
performance). We investigate how varying this setup af-
fects performance of the attack in Section 5.6.
Devices and tools: We tested our device fingerprint-
ing on devices from five different manufacturers. Table 2
highlights the model and quantities of the different phone
sets used in our experiments. As we emphasized earlier
we look at phones produced by both different and same
manufacturer; hence the difference in quantities in Ta-
ble 2.
We also investigate different genres of audio excerpts.
Table 3 describes the different types of audio excerpts
used in our experiments. Duration of the audio clips
varies from 3 to 10 seconds. The default sampling fre-
quency of all audio excerpts is 44.1kHz unless explic-
itly stated otherwise. All audio clips are stored in WAV
format using 16-bit pulse-code-modulation (PCM) tech-
nique.
For analysis we leverage the following audio tools and
analytic modules: MIRtollbox [14], Netlab [16], Audac-
ity [3] and the Android app Hertz [7]. Both MIRtoolbox
and Netlab are MATLAB modules providing a rich set
of functions for analyzing and extracting audio features.
Audacity and Hertz are mainly used for recording audio
clips on computers and smartphones respectively.
For analyzing and matching fingerprints we use a
desktop machine with the following configuration: Intel
i7-2600 3.4GHz processor with 12GiB RAM. We found
that the average time required to match a new fingerprint
was around 5–10 ms for k-NN classifier and around 0.5–
1 ms for GMM classifier.
Evaluation metrics: We use standard multi-
class classification metrics—precision, recall, and F1-
score [75]—in our evaluation. Assuming there are fin-
gerprints from n classes (i.e., n distinct phones), we first
compute the true positive (T P) rate for each class, i.e.,
the number of traces from the class that are classified cor-
rectly. Similarly, we compute the false positive (FP) and
false negative (FN), as the number of wrongly accepted
and wrongly rejected traces, respectively, for each class
i (1≤ i≤ n). We then compute precision, recall, and the
F1-score for each class using the following equations:
Precision, Pri =
T Pi
T Pi+FPi
(1)
Recall, Rei =
T Pi
T Pi+FNi
(2)
F1-Score, F1i =
2×Pri×Rei
Pri+Rei
(3)
The F1-score is the harmonic mean of precision and
recall; it provides a good measure of overall classifica-
tion performance, since precision and recall represent a
tradeoff: a more conservative classifier that rejects more
instances will have higher precision but lower recall, and
vice-versa. To obtain the overall performance of the
system we compute average values using the following
equations:
Avg. Precision, AvgPr =
∑ni=1 Pri
n
(4)
Avg. Recall, AvgRe =
∑ni=1 Rei
n
(5)
Avg. F1-Score, AvgF1 =
2×AvgPr×AvgRe
AvgPr+AvgRe
(6)
Each audio excerpt is recorded/played 10 times, 50%
of which is used for training and the remaining 50% is
used for testing. We report the maximum evaluations ob-
tained by varying the number of neighbors (k) from 1 to
5 for the k-NN classifier and considering 1 to 5 Gaussian
distributions per class. Since GMM parameters are pro-
duced by the randomized EM algorithm, we perform 10
parameter-generation runs for each instance and report
the average classification performance.2
5.2 Process of Fingerprinting Speakers
An attacker can leverage our algorithms to passively ob-
serve audio emitted from device speakers (e.g., ring-
tones), in public environments. To investigate this, we
first look at fingerprinting speakers integrated inside
smartphones. For fingerprinting speakers we record au-
dio clips played from smartphones onto a laptop and we
then extract acoustic features from the recorded audio ex-
cerpts as shown in Figure 4. We look at both devices
manufactured by different vendors and the same vendor.
2We also computed the 95% confidence interval, but we found it to
be less than 0.01.
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Figure 4: Steps of fingerprinting speakers.
5.3 Process of Fingerprinting Microphones
Attackers may also attempt to fingerprint devices by ob-
serving imperfections in device microphones, for exam-
ple by convincing the user to install an application on
their phone, which can observe inputs from the device’s
microphone. To investigate feasibility of this attack, we
will next look at fingerprinting microphones embedded
in smartphones. To do this, we record audio clips played
from a laptop onto smartphones as shown in Figure 5.
Again we look at both devices manufactured by different
vendors and the same vendor.
Figure 5: Steps of fingerprinting microphones.
5.4 Fingerprinting Devices From Different
Vendors
In this section we look at fingerprinting smartphones
manufactured by five different vendor. We look at fin-
gerprinting the devices through both microphone and
speaker.
5.4.1 Fingerprinting Speaker
We found fingerprinting smartphones manufactured by
different vendors is relatively simpler compared to fin-
gerprinting devices manufactured by the same vendor.
The main reason behind this is that the sensitivity of the
speaker volume of different smartphones were quite dif-
ferent making it easier to track them. Figure 6(a) shows
an audio sample played from five different smartphones.
As we see the signal strength of the audio signals are
quite different from each other. Hence, simple acoustic
features like RMS value and spectral entropy are good
enough to obtain good clusters of data points. Figure 6(b)
shows a plot of spectral entropy vs. RMS value for 50
samples of an audio excerpt (10 samples from each hand-
set). We see that acoustic features like spectral entropy
and RMS value generate good clusters for each type of
smartphone.
We test our fingerprinting approach using three dif-
ferent types of audio excerpts. Each audio sample is
recorded 10 times giving us a total of 50 samples from
the five handsets. 50% of the samples are used for train-
ing and the remaining 50% are used for testing, and we
repeat this procedure for the three different types of audio
excerpt. Table 4 summarizes our findings (values are re-
ported as percentages). We simply use signal RMS value
and spectral entropy as input features for the k-NN clas-
sifier, while for the GMM classifier we added MFCCs
as an additional feature because doing so increased the
GMM classifier’s success rate. From Table 4 we see
that we can successfully (with a precision rate of 100%)
identify which audio clip came from which smartphone.
Thus fingerprinting smartphones manufactured by differ-
ent vendors seems very much feasible using only 2 to 3
acoustic features.
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Figure 6: a) Audio sample taken from five different handsets.
b) Plotting audio samples taken from five different handsets us-
ing acoustic features — signal RMS value and spectral entropy.
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Table 4: Fingerprinting different smartphones using speaker
output
Audio k-NN GMM
Type Features [1,5]
∗ Features [1,5,13]∗
AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Instrumental 100 100 100 100 100 100
Human speech 100 100 100 100 100 100
Song 100 100 100 100 100 100
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 1
Table 5: Fingerprinting different smartphones using mic
Audio k-NN GMM
Type Features [1,5]
∗ Features [1,5,13]∗
AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Instrumental 96.7 96 96.3 96.7 96 96.3
Human speech 93.3 92 92.6 96.7 96 96.3
Song 96.7 96 96.3 100 100 100
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 1
5.4.2 Fingerprinting Microphone
Similar to speakers, we find microphone properties dif-
fer quite substantially across vendors, simplifying finger-
printing. In particular, the sensitivity of the microphones
of the five handsets were different. As a result, when
the same audio clip is recorded on the phones their re-
spective RMS value and spectral entropy are distinguish-
ably different, making it possible to fingerprint smart-
phones through microphones. To test our hypothesis we
again test our fingerprinting approach using three dif-
ferent types of audio excerpts. Each audio sample is
recorded 10 times, 50% of which are used for training
and the remaining 50% are used for testing. Table 5 sum-
marizes our findings (values are reported as percentages).
We use the same set of features as we did in section 5.4.1
and we see similar outcomes. These results suggest that
smartphones can be successfully fingerprinted through
microphones.
5.5 Fingerprinting Devices of the Same
Model
In this section we look at fingerprinting smartphones
manufactured by the same vendor. We found that this
was relatively a tougher problem and as such we first ex-
plore all the 15 acoustic features listed in Table 1 to deter-
mine the dominating subset of features. Next, we carry
out our fingerprinting task using the dominant subset of
acoustic features. We again fingerprint devices through
both microphone and speaker. Note that the audio ex-
cerpts used for feature exploration in Section 5.5.1 and
the ones used for evaluating our fingerprinting approach
in Section 5.5.2 and 5.5.3 are not identical. We use dif-
ferent audio excerpts, though belonging to the same cat-
egories as listed in Table 3, so as to not bias our evalua-
tions.
5.5.1 Feature Exploration
At first glance, it seems that we should use all features
at our disposal to identify device types. However, in-
cluding too many features can worsen performance in
practice, due to their varying accuracies and potentially-
conflicting signatures. Hence, in this section, we explore
all the 15 audio features described in Section 4.1 and
identify the dominating subset of all the features, i.e.,
which combination of features should be used. For this
purpose we adopt a well known machine learning strat-
egy known as feature selection [46, 78]. Feature selec-
tion is the process of reducing dimensionality of data by
selecting only a subset of the relevant features for use
in model construction. The main assumption in using
feature selection technique is that the data may contain
redundant features. Redundant features are those which
provide no additional benefit than the currently selected
features. Feature selection techniques are a subset of the
more general field of feature extraction, however, in prac-
tice they are quite different from each other. Feature ex-
traction creates new features as functions of the original
features, whereas feature selection returns a subset of the
features. Feature selection is preferable to feature extrac-
tion when the original units and meaning of features are
important and the modeling goal is to identify an influen-
tial subset. When the features themselves have different
dimensionality, and numerical transformations are inap-
propriate, feature selection becomes the primary means
of dimension reduction.
Feature selection involves the maximization of an ob-
jective function as it searches through the possible can-
didate subsets. Since exhaustive evaluation of all possi-
ble subsets are often infeasible (2N for a total of N fea-
tures) different heuristics are employed. We use a greedy
search strategy known as sequential forward selection
(SFS) where we start off with an empty set and sequen-
tially add the features that maximize our objective func-
tion. The pseudo code of our feature selection algorithm
is described in Algorithm 1.
The algorithm works as follows. First, we compute
the F1-score that can be achieved by each feature in-
dividually. Next, we sort the feature set based on the
achieved F1-score in descending order. Then, we itera-
tively add features starting from the most dominant one
and compute the F1-score of the combined feature sub-
set. If adding a feature increases the F1-score seen so
far we move on to the next feature, else we remove the
feature under inspection. Having traversed through the
entire set of features we return the subset of features that
maximizes our device classification task. Note that this is
a greedy approach, therefore, the generated subset might
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Table 6: Feature exploration using sequential forward selection technique
# Feature Avg. Feature-Extraction Time (msec)
Maximum F1-Score (%)
Instrumental Human Speech Song
Instrumental Human Speech Song k-NN GMM k-NN GMM k-NN GMM
1 RMS 9.26 10.01 11.23 21.8 17 37.9 34.4 20.1 26.2
2 ZCR 9.48 10.61 12.57 17.3 15.2 34.4 31.6 13 7.2
3 Low-Energy-Rate 29.28 32.62 39.27 9.4 39.6 18.3 13.7 21.8 19.2
4 Spectral Centroid 79.40 79.61 88.51 39.4 37.3 33.8 30.8 39.9 40.3
5 Spectral Entropy 57.54 46.58 61.88 39.6 39.6 30.4 38.7 33.9 26.1
6 Spectral Irregularity 6519.89 2387.04 15348.45 36 32.2 23.8 25.4 14.1 14.8
7 Spectral Spread 80.12 69.19 108.23 44.4 39.6 35.2 31.7 35.2 38.4
8 Spectral Skewness 120.29 109.26 179.33 32 41.7 30.1 34.3 31.5 40.4
9 Spectral Kurtosis 136.86 131.17 154.03 43 39.6 34.2 39.2 31.1 36.8
10 Spectral Rolloff 73.16 52.08 65.70 57.3 50.6 29 30.5 38.7 39.4
11 Spectral Brightness 63.91 45.51 59.94 23.5 19.9 33.5 33.5 18.5 17.9
12 Spectral Flatness 76.48 57.38 71.79 41.9 35.8 37.1 39.4 32.4 29.8
13 MFCCs 268.86 229.81 413.16 92.4 97.2 98.8 98.8 90 91.4
14 Chromagram 56.07 76.87 69.68 57.1 49.6 95.2 96.7 80.1 79.7
15 Tonal Centroid 79.54 99.95 85.79 57.1 46.1 93.7 95.2 63.6 53.7
Sequential Feature Selection [13,14] [13,14] [13] [13,14] [13,7] [13,14]96.3 97.7 98.8 100 92.6 94.1
Algorithm 1 Sequential Feature Selection
Input: Input feature set F
Output: Dominant feature subset D
F1 score← []
for f ∈ F do
F1 score[ f ]←Classi f y( f )
end for
F ′← sort(F,F1 score) #In descending order
max score← 0
D←∅
for f ∈ F ′ do
D← D∪ f
temp←Classi f y(D)
if temp > max score then
max score← temp
else
D← D−{ f}
end if
end for
return D
not always provide optimal F1-score. However, for our
purpose, we found this approach to perform well, as we
demonstrate in latter sections.
We test our feature selection algorithm for all three
types of audio excerpts listed in Table 3. We evaluate the
F1-score using both k-NN and GMM classifiers. Table 6
highlights the maximum F1-score obtained by varying
k from 1 to 5 (for k-NN classifier) and also considering
1 to 5 gaussian distributions per class (for GMM clas-
sifier). To obtain the fingerprinting data we record au-
dio clips played from 15 Motorola Droid A855 handsets.
Each type of audio is recorded 10 times giving us a to-
tal of 150 samples from the 15 handsets; 50% of which
(i.e., 5 samples per class) are used for training and the
remaining 50% are used for testing. All the training sam-
ples are labeled with their corresponding handset identi-
fier. Both classifiers return the class label for each audio
clip in the test set and from that we compute F1-score.
Table 6 shows the maximum F1-score achieved by each
acoustic feature for the three different types of audio ex-
cerpt. We also provide the time required to extract each
feature. The table highlights the subset of features se-
lected by our sequential feature selection algorithm and
their corresponding F1-score. We find that MFCCs are
the dominant feature for all category of audio excerpt.
Chromagram also generates high F1-score.
To give a better understanding of why MFCCs are the
dominant acoustic features we plot the MFCCs of a given
audio excerpt from three different handsets on Figure 7.
All the coefficients are ranked in the same order for the
three handsets. We can see that the magnitude of the co-
efficients vary across the three handsets. For example
coefficients 3 and 5 vary significantly across the three
handsets. This makes MFCCs a prevalent choice for fin-
gerprinting smartphones.
5.5.2 Fingerprinting Speakers
We now look at fingerprinting smartphones manufac-
tured by the same vendor. For these set of experiments
we use 15 Motorola Droid A855 handsets. Table 7 high-
lights our findings. We again test our fingerprinting ap-
proach against three different forms of audio excerpt. We
use the acoustic features obtained from our sequential
feature selection algorithm as listed in Table 6. From
Table 7, we see that we can achieve an F1-score of
over 94% in identifying which audio clip originated from
which handset. Thus fingerprinting smartphones through
speaker seems to be a viable option.
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Figure 7: MFCCs of the same audio sample taken from three different handsets manufactured by the same vendor. We can see that
some of the coefficients vary significantly, thus enabling us to exploit this feature to fingerprint smartphones.
Table 7: Fingerprinting similar smartphones using speaker out-
put
Audio k-NN GMM
Type Features∗ AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 Features∗ AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Instrumental [13,14] 96.7 96 96.3 [13,14] 98.3 98 98.1
Human speech [13] 98.9 98.7 98.8 [13,14] 98.9 98.7 98.8
Song [13,7] 93.7 92 92.8 [13,14] 95.6 93.3 94.4
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 6
5.5.3 Fingerprinting Microphone
We now investigate fingerprinting smartphones made by
the same vendor through microphone-sourced input. We
use 15 Motorola Droid A855 handsets for these experi-
ments. We use the features obtained through Algorithm 1
which are listed in Table 6. Table 8 summarizes our find-
ings. We see similar results compared to fingerprinting
speakers. We were able to achieve an F1-score of 93%
in identifying the handset from which the audio excerpt
originated. Thus fingerprinting smartphones through mi-
crophones also appears to be feasible.
Table 8: Fingerprinting similar smartphones using microphone
Audio k-NN GMM
Type Features∗ AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 Features∗ AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Instrumental [13,14] 93.7 92 92.8 [13,14] 94.1 92 93
Human speech [13] 98.9 98.7 98.8 [13,14] 98.9 98.7 98.8
Song [13,7] 93.9 93.3 93.6 [13,14] 96.1 95.2 95.6
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 6
5.6 Sensitivity Analysis
In this section we investigate how different factors such
as audio sampling rate, training set size, the distance
from audio source to recorder, and background noise im-
pact our fingerprinting performance. Such investigations
will help us determine the conditions under which our
fingerprinting approach will be feasible. For the follow-
ing set of experiments we will only focus on fingerprint-
ing smartphones from the same vendor and we only con-
sider fingerprinting speakers as we saw almost identical
outcomes for fingerprinting microphones. We also con-
sider recording only ringtones (i.e., an audio clip belong-
ing to our defined Instrumental category) for the follow-
ing experiments. Since we are recording ringtones we
only use the features highlighted in Table 6 under ‘In-
strumental’ category.
5.6.1 Impact of Sampling Rate
First, we investigate how the sampling rate of audio sig-
nals impacts our fingerprinting precision. To do this,
we record a ringtone at the following three frequencies:
8kHz, 22.05kHz and 44.1kHz. Each sample is recorded
10 times with half of them being used for training and
the other half for testing. Figure 8 shows the average pre-
cision and recall obtained under different sampling rates.
As we can see from the figure, as sampling frequency de-
creases, the precision/recall also goes down. This is un-
derstandable, because the higher the sampling frequency
the more fine-tuned information we have about the au-
dio sample. However, the default sampling frequency
on most handheld devices today is 44.1kHz [4], with
some of the latest models adopting even higher sampling
rates [1]. We, therefore, believe sampling rate will not
impose an obstacle to our fingerprinting approach, and
in future we will be able to capture more fine grained
variations with the use of higher sampling rates.
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Figure 8: Impact of sampling frequency on precision/recall.
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5.6.2 Varying Training Size
Next, we consider performance of the classifiers in the
presence of limited training data. For this experiment we
vary the training set size from 10% to 50% (i.e., from 1
to 5 samples per class) of all available samples. Table 9
shows the evolution of the F1-score as training set size
is increased (values are reported as percentages). We see
that as the training set size increases the F1-score also
rises which is expected. However, we see that with only
three samples per class we can achieve an F1-score of
over 90%. This suggests that we do not need too many
training samples to construct a good predictive model.
Table 9: Impact of varying training size
Training k-NN GMM
samples Features [13,14]∗ Features [13,14]∗
per class AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
1 42 49.3 45.3 50 53.3 51.6
2 79.2 80 79.6 80.4 80 80.2
3 91.3 89.3 90.2 91.7 89.3 90.5
4 95.3 94.7 95 95.6 94.7 95.1
5 96.7 96 96.3 98.3 98 98.1
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 6
5.6.3 Varying Distance between Audio Source and
Recorder
Next, we inspect the impact of distance between the
audio source (i.e., smartphone) and recorder (i.e., lap-
top/PC) on fingerprinting precision/recall. For this ex-
periment we use a separate external microphone as
the signal capturing capacity of microphones embed-
ded inside laptops degrades drastically as distance in-
creases. We use the relatively inexpensive ($44.79)
Audio-Technica ATR-6550 shotgun microphone for this
experiment and vary the distance between the external
microphone and smartphone from 0.1 meter to 5 me-
ters. Figure 9 shows the experimental setup and Table 10
summarizes the F1-scores obtained as the distance be-
tween the smartphone and microphone varies. We see
that as distance increases, F1-score decreases. This is ex-
pected, because as the distance between the smartphone
and microphone increases, the harder it becomes to cap-
ture the minuscule deviations between audio samples.
However, we see that even up to two meters distance we
can achieve an F1-score of 93%. This suggests that our
device fingerprinting approach works only up to a certain
distance using any commercial microphones. However,
using specialized microphones, such as parabolic micro-
phones (usually used in capturing animal sounds from a
far distance) could help in increasing the fingerprinting
precision at even longer distances.
Figure 9: Experimental setup for varying the distance between
the smartphone and microphone.
Table 10: Impact of varying distance
Dintance k-NN GMM
(meters) Features [13,14]
∗ Features [13,14]∗
AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
0.1 96.7 96 96.3 98.3 98 98.1
1 92.7 91.5 92 95.2 94.7 94.9
2 88.2 87.6 87.9 94.5 92 93.2
3 76.7 76 76.3 78.9 84 81.4
4 70.2 64 67 76.8 76 76.4
5 64.5 62.7 63.6 77 73.3 75.1
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 6
5.6.4 Impact of Ambient Background Noise
In this section we investigate how ambient background
noise impacts the performance of our fingerprinting tech-
nique. For this experiment we consider scenario types
were there is a crowd of people using their smart de-
vices and we are trying to fingerprint those devices by
capturing audio signals (in this case ringtones) from the
surrounding environment. Table 11 highlights the four
different scenarios that we are considering. To capture
audio signals under such scenarios – external speakers
(2 pieces), placed between the smartphone and micro-
phone, were constantly replaying the respective ambi-
ent noise in the background while recording of ringtones
played from different handsets were taking place. We
consider a distance of two meters from the audio source
to recorder. The ambient background sounds were ob-
tained from PacDV [2] and SoundJay [17]. Table 11
shows our findings (values are reported as percentages).
We can see that even in the presence of various back-
ground noise we can achieve an F1-score of over 91%.
Table 11: Impact of ambient background noise
Environments
k-NN GMM
Features [13,14]∗ Features [13,14]∗
AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1 AvgPr AvgRe AvgF1
Shopping Mall 88.8 85.3 87 95.1 93.3 94.2
Restaurant/Cafe 90.5 89.7 90.1 92.5 90.7 91.6
City Park 91.7 90 90.8 95.2 94.1 94.6
Airport Gate 91.3 89.5 90.4 94.5 93.3 93.9
∗ Feature numbers taken from Table 6
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6 Applications
Fingerprinting smart devices can be thought of as a
double-edged sword when it comes to device security.
On one hand, it can jeopardize privacy, as it allows re-
mote identification without user awareness. On the other
hand, it could potentially be used to enhance authenti-
cation of physical devices. We discuss these potential
applications below.
6.1 Multi-factor Authentication
Conventional computing systems authenticate users by
verifying some static factors such as user generated pass-
words (which may be coupled with additional security
questions like pin code or phone number). A password
consists of a string of characters, remembered by the
human user, which can be provided as a proof of iden-
tity. However, passwords are vulnerable to guessing al-
gorithms. Moreover, if passwords ever leak they poten-
tially open an opportunity for an unauthenticated user to
get access to the system. Often systems do not incorpo-
rate mechanisms to verify whether the authenticated user
is using an authorized device. Modern highly-secure or-
ganizations (e.g., military and department of defense) are
therefore, moving towards using various forms of active
authentication for their employees [5].
Device fingerprinting can be used to provide a multi-
factor authentication framework that will enable a sys-
tem administrator to validate whether authenticated users
are using their allocated devices to log in into the sys-
tem. This scenario of course is applicable to high-
security conscious organizations where tracking authen-
ticated users is not against any privacy violation. This
can be done by leveraging our techniques, for example
by instructing the user’s device to record an audio sam-
ple broadcast over the PA system, or transmit an audio
session over the phone. Alternatively, the device may be
able to “fingerprint itself”, by playing a received small
audio clip out its speaker, simultaneously recording via
its microphone, and then transmitting the result over the
network to the authentication server for verification3. In
this way we can tie both user and device identity together
to form a multi-factor authentication framework. As a
side note this only provides additional assurance, rather
than a foolproof authentication method. However, we
believe our approach is more robust than existing soft-
ware based two-factor authentication systems (e.g., for
systems where you need to submit a token along with a
password, if the attacker gets hold off the secret key then
he/she can generate the desired token) as it is harder to
mimic hardware level imperfections.
3We are assuming that the user is not using a headphone at the start
of authentication.
6.2 Device Tracking
By the same token, an attacker can violate user privacy
by via a similar approach, or installing a malicious ap-
plication on the user’s device, or recording broadcasted
audio in public environments. For example, a malicious
application (e.g., a game) can play small audio segments,
record them using the device’s microphone, and upload
recorded clips to the attacker. To do this, the application
would require access to both microphone and network
access permission, but this might not be a big assump-
tion to make: most users are unaware of the security risks
associated with mobile apps and a significant portion of
the users cannot fully comprehend the full extension of
all the permissions [38, 53].
Alternatively, the attacker may sit in public environ-
ments (cafe, shopping mall), and record broadcasted au-
dio (speakerphone conversations, ringtones) with the in-
tent to track and identify users.
7 Related Work
Fingerprints have long been used as one of the most com-
mon biometrics in identifying human beings [29, 72].
The same concept was extended to identifying and track-
ing unique mobile transmitters by the US government
during 1960s [55]. Later on with the emergence of cellu-
lar networks people were able to uniquely identify trans-
mitters by analyzing the externally observable character-
istics of the emitted radio signals [71].
Physical devices are usually different at either the soft-
ware or hardware level even if they are produced by the
same vendor. In terms of software based fingerprint-
ing researchers have looked at fingerprinting techniques
that differentiates between unique devices over a Wire-
less Local Area Network (WLAN) simply through a tim-
ing analysis of 802.11 probe request frames [31]. Oth-
ers have looked at exploiting the difference in firmware
and device driver running on IEEE 802.11 compliant de-
vices [39]. 802.11 MAC headers have also been used to
track unique devices [44]. Pang et al. [67] were able to
exploit traffic patterns to carry out device fingerprinting.
Open source toolkits like Nmap [59] and Xprobe [79] can
remotely fingerprint an operating system by identifying
unique responses from the TCP/IP networking stack.
Another angle to software based fingerprinting is to
exploit applications like browsers to carry out device
fingerprinting [35]. Yen et al. [80] were successful at
tracking users with high precision by analyzing month-
long logs of Bing and Hotmail. Researchers have also
been able to exploit JavaScript and popular third-party
plugins like Flash player to obtain the list of fonts in-
stalled in a device which then enabled them to uniquely
track users [19]. Other researchers have proposed the use
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of performance benchmarks for differentiating between
JavaScript engines [64]. Furthermore, browsing history
can be exploited to fingerprint and track web users [66].
The downside of software based fingerprints is that such
fingerprints are generated from the current configuration
of the system which is not static, rather it is likely to
change over time.
Hardware based fingerprinting approaches rely on
some static source of idiosyncrasies. It has been
shown that network devices tends to have constant clock
skews [63] and researchers have been able to exploit
these clock skews to distinguish devices through TCP
and ICMP timestamps [54]. However, clock skew rate
is highly dependent on the experimental environment.
Researchers have also extensively looked at fingerprint-
ing the unique transient characteristics of radio transmit-
ters (also known as Radio Frequency (RF) fingerprint-
ing). RF fingerprinting has been shown as a means of
enhancing wireless authentication [22, 57, 65, 77]. It has
also been used for location detection [68]. Manufac-
turing imperfections in network interface cards (NICs)
have also been studied by analyzing analog signals trans-
mitted from them [23, 41]. More recently Dey et al.
have studied manufacturing idiosyncrasies inside smart-
phone accelerometer to distinguish devices [32]. How-
ever, their approach requires some form of external stim-
ulation/vibration to successfully capture the manufactur-
ing imperfection of the on-board accelerometer. More-
over, there are different contexts in which audio prints
can be more useful, e.g., software that is not allowed to
access the accelerometer, as well as an external adversary
who fingerprints nearby phones with a microphone.
Our work is inspired by the aforementioned hardware
based fingerprinting works, but instead of focusing on
wireless transmitters or on-board sensors that require ex-
ternal stimulation, we focus on fingerprinting on-broad
acoustic components like microphones and speakers.
Audio fingerprinting has a rich history of notable re-
search works [25]. There are studies that have looked at
classifying audio excerpts based on their content [45,76].
Others have looked at distinguishing human speakers
from audio segments [21, 24]. There has also been work
on exploring various acoustic features for audio classifi-
cation [61]. One of the more popular applications of au-
dio fingerprinting has been music genre and artist recog-
nition [47, 56].
Our work takes advantage of the large set of acoustic
features that have been explored by the aforementioned
works. However, instead of classifying the content of
audio segments, we are utilizing the acoustics features to
capture the manufacturing imperfections of microphones
and speakers embedded in smart devices.
8 Discussion and Limitations
Our approach has several limitations. First, we experi-
mented with 15 devices manufactured by the same ven-
dor; it is possible that a larger target device pool would
result in lower accuracy. That said, distinctions across
different device types are more clear; additionally, au-
dio fingerprints may be used in tandem with other tech-
niques, such as accelerometer fingerprinting [32], to bet-
ter discriminate between devices. Secondly, we evalu-
ated our fingerprinting precision/recall under only two
types of classifiers (GMM and k-NN). Other forms of
classification such as ensemble based approaches could
possibly achieve better results, as ensemble based meth-
ods use multiple models to obtain better predictive per-
formance than any single classifier [33]. However, as
a first step we were able to achieve over 93% precision
using simple k-NN and GMM classifiers, and our re-
sults may point to the concern that relatively simple tech-
niques have a high success rate. Lastly, all the phones
used in our experiments were not in mint condition and
some of the idiosyncrasies of individual microphones
and speakers may have been the result of uneven wear
and tear on each device; we believe, however, that this is
likely to occur in the real world as well.
9 Conclusion
In this paper we show that it is feasible to finger-
print smart devices through on-board acoustic compo-
nents like microphones and speakers. As microphones
and speakers are one of the most standard components
present in almost all smart devices available today, this
creates a key privacy concern for users. By the same to-
ken, efficient fingerprinting may also serve to enhance
authentication. To demonstrate feasibility of this ap-
proach, we collect fingerprints from five different brands
of smartphones, as well as from 15 smartphones manu-
factured by the same vendor. Our studies show that it is
possible to successfully fingerprint smartphones through
microphones and speakers, not only under controlled en-
vironments, but also in the presence of ambient noise.
We believe our findings are important steps towards un-
derstanding the full consequences of fingerprinting smart
devices through acoustic channels.
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A Audio Features
Root-Mean-Square (RMS) Energy: This feature com-
putes the square root of the arithmetic mean of the
squares of the original audio signal strength at vari-
ous frequencies. In the case of a set of N values
{x1,x2, . . . ,xN}, the RMS value is given by the follow-
ing formula:
xrms =
√
1
n
(
x21+ x
2
2+ · · ·+ x2N
)
(7)
The RMS value provides an approximation of the aver-
age audio signal strength.
Zero Crossing Rate (ZCR): The zero-crossing rate is
the rate at which the signal changes sign from positive to
negative or back [27]. This feature has been used heav-
ily in both speech recognition and music information re-
trieval, for example to classify percussive sounds [43].
ZCR for a signal s of length T can be defined as:
ZCR =
1
T
T
∑
t=1
|s(t)− s(t−1)| (8)
where s(t) = 1 if the signal has a positive amplitude at
time t and 0 otherwise. Zero-crossing rates provide a
measure of the noisiness of the signal.
Low Energy Rate: The low energy rate computes the
percentage of frames (typically 50ms chunks) with RMS
power less than the average RMS power for the whole
audio signal. For instance, a musical excerpt with some
very loud frames and a lots of silent frames would have
a high low-energy rate.
Spectral Centroid: The spectral centroid represents
the “center of mass” of a spectral power distribution. It
is calculated as the weighted mean of the frequencies
present in the signal, determined using a fourier trans-
form, with their magnitudes as the weights:
Centroid,µ = ∑
N
i=1 fi ·mi
∑Ni=1 mi
(9)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i, and
fi represents the center frequency of that bin.
Spectral Entropy: Spectral entropy captures the spik-
iness of a spectral distribution. As a result spectral en-
tropy can be used to capture the formants or peaks in
the sound envelope [62]. To compute spectral entropy,
a Digital Fourier Transform (DFT) of the signal is first
carried out. Next, the frequency spectrum is converted
into a probability mass function (PMF) by normalizing
the spectrum using the following equation:
wi =
mi
∑Ni=1 mi
(10)
where mi represents the energy/magnitude of the i-th fre-
quency component of the spectrum, w=(w1,w2, . . . ,wN)
is the PMF of the spectrum and N is the number of points
in the spectrum. This PMF can then be used to compute
the spectral entropy using the following equation:
H =
N
∑
i=1
wi · log2wi (11)
The central idea of using entropy as a feature is to capture
the peaks of the spectrum and their location.
Spectral Irregularity: Spectral irregularity measures
the degree of variation of the successive peaks of a spec-
trum. This feature provides the ability to capture the jitter
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or noise in spectra. Spectral irregularity is computed as
the sum of the square of the difference in amplitude be-
tween adjoining spectral peaks [50] using the following
equation:
Irregularity =
∑Ni=1(ai−ai+1)2
∑Ni=1 a2i
(12)
where the (N + 1)-th peak is assumed to be zero. A
change in irregularity changes the perceived timbre of
a sound.
Spectral Spread: Spectral spread defines the dispersion
of the spectrum around its centroid, i.e., it measures the
standard deviation of the spectral distribution. So it can
be computed as:
Spread,σ =
√
N
∑
i=1
[( fi−µ)2 ·wi] (13)
where wi represents the weight of the i-th frequency com-
ponent obtained from equation (10) and µ represents the
centroid of the spectrum obtained from equation (9).
Spectral Skewness: Spectral skewness computes the
coefficient of skewness of a spectrum. Skewness (third
central moment) measures the symmetry of the distribu-
tion. A distribution can be positively skewed in which
case it has a long tail to the right while a negatively-
skewed distribution has a longer tail to the left. A sym-
metrical distribution has a skewness of zero. The coef-
ficient of skewness is the ratio of the skewness to the
standard deviation raised to the third power.
Skewness =
∑Ni=1
[
( fi−µ)3 ·wi
]
σ3
(14)
Spectral Kurtosis: Spectral Kurtosis gives a measure
of the flatness or spikiness of a distribution relative to a
normal distribution. It is computed from the fourth cen-
tral moment using the following function:
Kurtosis =
∑Ni=1
[
( fi−µ)4 ·wi
]
σ4
(15)
A kurtosis value of 3 means the distribution is similar
to a normal distribution whereas values less than 3 refer
to flatter distributions and values greater than 3 refers to
steeper distributions.
Spectral Rolloff: The spectral rolloff is defined as the
frequency below which 85% of the distribution magni-
tude is concentrated [76]
argmin
fc∈{1,...,N}
fc
∑
i=1
mi ≥ 0.85 ·
N
∑
i=1
mi (16)
where fc is the rolloff frequency and mi is the magnitude
of the i-th frequency component of the spectrum. The
rolloff is another measure of spectral shape that is corre-
lated to the noise cutting frequency [69].
Spectral Brightness: Spectral brightness calculates the
amount of spectral energy corresponding to frequencies
higher than a given cut-off threshold. This metric cor-
relates to the perceived timbre of a sound. Increase of
higher frequency energy in the spectrum yields a sharper
timbre, whereas a decrease yields a softer timbre [52].
Spectral brightness can be computed using the following
equation:
Brightness fc =
N
∑
i= fc
mi (17)
where fc is the cut-off frequency (set to 1500Hz) and mi
is the magnitude of the i-th frequency component of the
spectrum.
Spectral Flatness: Spectral flatness measures how en-
ergy is spread across the spectrum, giving a high value
when energy is equally distributed and a low value when
energy is concentrated in a small number of narrow fre-
quency bands. The spectral flatness is calculated by di-
viding the geometric mean of the power spectrum by the
arithmetic mean of the power spectrum [51]:
Flatness =
[
∏Ni=1 mi
]1/N
1
N ∑
N
i=1 mi
(18)
where mi represents the magnitude of bin number i.
Spectral flatness provides a way to quantify the noise-
like or tone-like nature of the signal. One advantage of
using spectral flatness is that it is not affected by the am-
plitude of the signal, meaning spectral flatness virtually
remains unchanged when the distance between the sound
source and microphone fluctuates during recording.
Mel-Frequency Cepstrum Coefficients (MFCCs):
MFCCs are short-term spectral features and are widely
used in the area of audio and speech processing [58, 76].
Their success has been due to their capability of com-
pactly representing spectrum amplitudes. Figure 10
highlights the procedure for extracting MFCCs from au-
dio signals. The first step is to divide the signal into fixed
size frames (typically 50ms chunks) by applying a win-
dowing function at fixed intervals. The next step is to
take Discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of each frame.
After taking the log-amplitude of the magnitude spec-
trum, the DFT bins are grouped and smoothed accord-
ing to the perceptually motivated Mel-frequency scal-
ing4. Finally, in order to decorrelate the resulting feature
vectors a discrete cosine transform is performed. We use
the first 13 coefficients for our experiments.
4Mel-scale approximates the human auditory response more closely
than the linearly-spaced frequency bands. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Mel scale
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Figure 10: Procedure for extracting MFCCs from audio signals
Chromagram: A chromagram (also known as har-
monic pitch class profile) is a 12-dimensional vector rep-
resentation of an audio signal showing the distribution of
energy along the 12 distinct semitones or pitch classes.
First a DFT of the audio signal is taken and then the
spectral frequencies are mapped onto a limited set of 12
chroma values in a many-to-one fashion [40]. In general,
chromagrams are robust to noise (e.g., ambient noise or
percussive sounds) and independent of timbre change.
Tonal Centroid: Tonal centroid introduced by Harte
et al. [48] maps a chromagram onto a six-dimensional
Hypertorus structure. The resulting representation wraps
around the surface of a Hypertorus, and can be visual-
ized as a set of three circles of harmonic pitch intervals:
fifths, major thirds, and minor thirds. Tonal centroids are
efficient in detecting changes in harmonic contents.
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